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China's Use of International Law
In Border Disputes:
The Cases of India and the Soviet Union
LARRY R. SCHREITER
Introduction: International Law and China's Territorial Claims
Despite American "containment" in the fifties and sixties, China was
nevertheless a major actor on the international scene. The loci of China's practice
of international politics ranged from the Bandung Conference to its ideological
foray into European politics following the Hungarian rebellion in 1956. Along with
this activism in the international environment, China turned her attention in the
late fifties to the question of gaining mutual agreements with her neighbors
on the delineation and regulation of the boundaries. This concern brought about
some marked changes in bilateral foreign policy, and required dealings of both an
ideological as well as technical nature on a highly sensitive political matter,
with limited success.
Burma and China, for example, reached an amicable settlement with no great
difficulty, despite a history of Chinese provocations along the border, and the
accession to power during the negotiations between the two sides of a Burmese
rightist military regime.' China concluded four other boundary agreements with
neighboring countries between 1960 and 1964.' But with India, China signed
no agreements after the 1954 document regulating trade between India and the
"Tibet region of China."' Instead, thousands of incidents along the whole length of
their boundary preceded the full-scale Chinese invasion of 1962. The Chinese
withdrawal notwithstanding, no settlement has since ensued. And when the
squabbling between Russia and China led Khrushchev to criticize Peking's handling
of the Indian border dispute ("What are a few kilometers?"), the Sino-Soviet
disagreement regarding territorial issues emerged into public view with Peking's
charge that Khrushchev was the first leader of the world Communist movement in
history to support imperialist territorial aggression against a fraternal socialist
country.4 The eventual widening of the schism to include revived frontier disputes
found each party accusing the other of introducing to the debate "problems
between states," escalating the intensity of the conflict.5 Six years of dispute
preceded the 1969 clashes between the erstwhile Communist allies; these skirmishes
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carried far more serious implications than those with India had, for a full-scale
invasion of India involved only a small force, whereas along the enormous length
of the Sino-Soviet boundary, both countries, maintained sizeable armies, although
recent years have not seen a renewal of the fighting.
In these two unresolved border disputes, involving years of claim-making and
justification, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has often
explicitly invoked concepts of international law to bolster its own contentions.
In addition, the PRC has often disputed its opponent's arguments in the form of
rebuttal of points of international law. The questions to be considered in this
essay are whether the PRC applies different concepts of international law in
dealing with these two boundary disputes, and if so, how these differences are to be
construed. Does the concept of international law invoked vary with the political
color of China's negotiating partner, that is, is the distinction drawn on the basis
of dealings with a Communist as against a non-Communist government? Does the
PRC offer or expect a different order of reciprocity as to views of rights and
obligations flowing from international law with respect to the Soviet Union than
that offered or expected with respect to India? If so, what are the origins of
the difference? What can the disparity tell us about the function of international
law when invoked by a revolutionary Communist state?
The Uses of "General" International Law and the Indian Border Dispute
International law derives meaning only through the study of relations between
states. The problems of territory are a prime concern for international law, and
the concept of boundaries has proved both durable and necessary. A boundary
treaty is an agreement by two states to demarcate the physical line of division of
sovereign actions from international interactions; such agreements are instruments
of international legal standing with two primary functions: to provide an essential
demarcation for the protection of territorial sovereignty, and to institutionalize
a criterion by which to assess a neighbor's intentions, i.e. to provide a means
of measurement of the expansion and contraction of power in the form of territory.6
In the absence of such agreements, a boundary may be considered to run along a
"customary" line determined by the extent of each side's historical exercise of
jurisdiction. 7 The most authoritative source of materials from the Sino-Indian
dialogue concerning the border and the development of each side's legally-based
claims is the extraordinary exchange of letters that took place between Chou En-lai
and Nehru from 1958 to 1961.8 The letter exchange began when Nehru, under
the pressure of a growing number of border incidents, sought to draw forth a
Chinese statement of their position on the boundary, an issue that Nehru claimed
at the time not to have understood to be in dispute.9 In an important response
on January 23, 1959, Chou En-lai pointed out that the Indian government had
erred in assuming that the 1954 Agreement on Trade had implied the existence of a
mutually acceptable border, since in the Chinese view, this document dealt with
nothing outside of the Tibet issue.10 As to his own government's position on
recurrent incidents along the border, Chou stated that the Sino-Indian border had
never been delimited and therefore incidents would inevitably occur. Furthermore,
not only had physical delineation never taken place, but the governments of India
and China had never signed any agreement or treaty regarding the border. This
statement surprised the Indian government, for they considered the Simla
Conference of 1914 and the agreements signed between Indian and Chinese officials
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at the regional level to be legal. This was a perfectly logical position to take,
especially since just three years before in 1956, Chou made an offer publicly to
recognize boundaries based on the old McMahon Line between China and both
India and Burma on account of "friendly relations" existing between both countries
and China. The offer was honored in the case of Burma, where the McMahon
Line became the boundary stipulated in the agreement discussed above." But
in the Indian case, Chou apparently expressed his government's displeasure at
Indian reactions to the suppression of the Tibetan revolt when, in response to
Nehru's inquiry, he replied that the McMahon Line is "a product of British
aggression against the Tibet Region of China" which therefore "juridically cannot be
considered legal. . . fbecause) it has never been recognized by the Chinese central
government."' Thus in this instance Peking viewed the whole issue as a political
question rather than a technically legal one; yet the Chinese view of the political
content of the issue carries with it the convenient conclusion that the Indian claims
cannot be construed as resting on solid legal bases. This is an illustration of the
PRC's disposition to trade agreement on the alignment of a boundary for political
advantage; in line with the view of frontier questions as matters for political, not
judicial, resolution." Nevertheless the Chinese did not demean international law
or attack it on ideological grounds when it made an appearance in India's claims.
Rather the Chinese developed their claim on distinctly legal grounds, with Chou
calling for the negotiation of an agreement upon the location of a customary
boundary, the existence of which neither side could dispute. The necessity for
negotiation arises from the fact that each side holds a very different view of
the customary extent of its jurisdiction, and hence the location of the line itself."'
In refuting India's version, China concludes that its own version is based on
objective fact while the Indian's version derives from the legacy of British
imperialism. An example of the type of "objective fact" on which the PRC bases
its claim of Chinese "effective jurisdiction" over the western sector of the border
appears in the Chou-Nehru Note of April 3, 1960." The note cites the Chinese
ability between 1950 and 1958 to construct a road through Indian-claimed territory
from Sinkiang to Tibet, and the Indian government's inability to discover, much
less control, the movements of "Chinese personnel and supplies which had busily
traveled between Sinkiang and Tibet through this area."' 6 The implication is clearly
that India should simply abandon her claims, since the Sino-Indian boundary, a
complicated matter left over by history, runs between two countries which were both
"long subjected to imperialist aggression. This common experience should have
naturally caused China and India to hold an identical view."' 7 Chou's point is that
India should not resist the PRC's efforts to consolidate the revolution in Tibet,
which in large part was the purpose behind the undertaking of the Sinkiang-Tibet
Highway construction. Although historical documents relating to the contended
areas were in fact signed by the British governors of India and "local Tibet
authorities," such agreements were not valid, since local officials had no power to
treat with foreign governments, Chou is making it known that what was not the case
historically under imperialist administration is even more emphatically not the
case since the Liberation. The matter of Tibet is a Chinese internal affair, to
be dealt with by Peking with no interference from the direction of New Delhi.
Thus by giving or withholding border agreements, China rewards friendly
nations (Burma) with a cessation of border incidents, and exerts pressure on other
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governments which are reluctant to support, or are even actively opposing Peking's
views in matters of concern. If these are tactical variations chosen to fit policy
objectives rather than differences arising from the application of international law
to substantively distinct legal circumstances, then their appearance accords with the
view of Chu Li-lu, writing in Jen-min ih-pao, that "international law is an
instrument for settling international problems; if this instrument is useful to our
country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of peace of peoples of the world,
we will use it . . . if it is disadvantageous we will not use it."'8 That is, international
law is a political instrument, useful only if it can undergo change according to
circumstances, for "international law is . . . formulated not by a super-legislature
but through agreement reached by the process of struggle, cooperation, compromise,
and consultation."'9 But if China wishes to correlate concepts of international
law to the particular political situation, to the particular stage of struggle taking
place, then serious contradictions arise when a dispute looms with her Communist
neighbor, the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Border Dispute and "Socialist" International Law
Prior to the Sino-Soviet dispute, writers on international problems in China
proclaimed that relations between socialist nations are a completely new kind
of international relations because these countries are united by the ideals and
objectives of Communism; conflicts of interests, or fundamental contradictions,
neither exist in the present nor have existed in the past. Chinese theoretical literature,
therefore, generally distinguishes conceptually the relations among Communist states
from the relations between Communist and non-Communist states." The general
international law which the PRC considers to regulate relations with non-Communist
nations such as India is based on principles related to the sovereign equality of
states, a doctrine to which the PRC vigorously subscribes." These principles
of equality are embodied in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual
respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference
in internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit) showcased at Bandung, which
taken with recognized practices of international law, comprise what China
recognizes as general international law. But Peking takes the position that
principles of general international law are inadequate and inappropriate for the
conduct of affairs between socialist states. These relations are to be governed by
"socialist" international law, which combines the same principles of equality
(now designated Leninist) with the principle of proletarian internationalism.
For the PRC, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the concept of
proletarian internationalism constitute the two most fundamental doctrines of
contemporary socialist international law." The joint Sino-Soviet view put forth at
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 was that principles of peaceful coexistence
(PCX) were the heart of bloc international policy, but that these did not apply
to international relations within the socialist bloc.23 This action was prompted by
events in Europe, necessitating a legal basis for the new relations the Soviet Union
was undertaking with other socialist countries such as Hungary.24 The leading
principle of the new socialist international law is proletarian internationalism.25
The implication of proletarian internationalism (PI) for international relations
among Communist states therefore discounts by definition the possibility of aggression
or interference in internal affairs. The principle of PI, viewed as an ideology and
a definite type of relationship between national detachments of the working class
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built on a voluntary basis, has become, since the proliferation of Communist states,
the principle underlying the assumption of common interests among them."
Likewise PI underlies the development of a concept of socialist international law
which purports not to deny the independent rights of individual national detachments
of the working class while preserving the "unity" of the international proletariat."
Although PI does not restrict sovereignty, nevertheless, if general international
law posits theoretical limits to the pursuit of national interests, socialist international
law establishes more severely circumscribed limits, for by definition, the interests
of two Communist states cannot be in conflict.
The evidence suggests that during the period of Mao's "Lean to one side"
policy, the Chinese delayed bringing up the topic of border adjustments in light of a
pressing need for Soviet diplomatic, military, economic, and technical aid, and
Mao's own admiration for Stalin as leader of the world Communist movement.2&
But within months of Stalin's death, the Chinese leaders attempted and failed
to initiate a dialogue concerning adjustment of the Mongolian border during
Khrushchev's visit to Peking. In 1957, during Chou En-lai's European tour,
Khrushchev again refused to discuss territorial questions." And in 1960, when
former head of state Liu Shao-ch'i attempted to raise the border question at
the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, Khrushchev ignored him.30 So when
Khrushchev belittled Peking's concern over Indian "aggression", the Chinese
delivered a blistering attack on the Premier's "adventurism and capitulationism"
in the Cuban missile crisis. In answering, Khrushchev stated that his policy was
pragmatic, and as such was comparable to Peking's own policy, which had hitherto
pragmatically tolerated the continued presence of the ports of Hong Kong and
Macao, both of which came into existence through the same treaties that gave
Russia jurisdiction over areas now claimed by China. The Chinese response of
March 8, 1963, found a way out of this logical dilemma, in a principle by which to
attack the treaties in terms of sources of international law. Based on concepts
borrowed from Russian legal thinking, this note makes the first public assertion
that the treaties under which such concessions as were criticized by the Soviets had
come into existence were "unequal." The inequality taints and invalidates the
treaties, because the primary source of international law is agreement between
states." Like the Soviet Union, the PRC accepts treaties and agreements as
the major sources of international law; but the Chinese focus on the aspect of
consent, a partner's willingness to be bound by an agreement at the time of signing,
as the "ultimate source of its binding effect upon the parties."" The assumption
of sovereign equality is essential to the argument; but socialist international law
holds that a new state acquires upon its creation the same rights the original states
possessed when they created the prior law. New states thereby gain the right to
review agreements entered into by its predecessor, and "decide whether it wishes to
be bound by it or not. To refuse to permit . . . review would contradict . . . the
principle of equality of states."33 Indeed, the Russian Communists soon after
coming to power had repudiated treaties imposed by the Czars, 34 and modern law
books in the Soviet Union state that the first socialist state's abrogation of "unequal"
treaties from the very outset was a major contribution to the growth of a socialist
international law.35 In the November 1963 Note, the PRC insisted that with
the Soviet Union, at least, the time had come for the "unequal treaties," subject to
renegotiation by the Soviet's own concepts of international legality, and the borders
defined in these treaties, to be redefined.36 The Soviets sharply attacked this view
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arguing that because of their Chinese population the status of Hong Kong or
Macao might properly be questioned; but to the contrary, the border with the Soviet
Union must be distinguished since it "developed historically and was fixed by
life itself, and treaties regarding the border cannot be disregarded."" The Chinese
reject this argument, for treaties are either equal or unequal and the latter undermine
the most fundamental principles of international law (e.g., such as sovereign
equality). They are therefore illegal and states have the right to abrogate such
treaties at any time." Although the Chinese do not make explicit what constitutes
equality, verbal reciprocity in the language of the treaty is not sufficient if "state
character, economic strength, and the substance of correlation of the contracting
states" are not taken into account." Thus for the PRC the relevant historical
change in the Soviet case is that the two countries' Communist revolutions have
created a situation wherein the Soviets, in Peking's view, should extend to their
fraternal comrades the opportunity to relegate the treaties of the Czars to the
garbage heap of history in accordance with the principle of PI. As a conciliatory
measure, Peking was "willing" to respect the treaties as a basis for negotiations
"guided by proletarian internationalism." The Chinese offered Moscow an easy
settlement of the border question if only the Soviet side would take the same
attitude as the Chinese government. Negotiations began on February 25, 1964, in
Peking, but the Soviet delegation most emphatically did not share their host's views,
and the talks broke off after more than three months without progress. Little
movement in positions is to be found thereafter; a CPSU letter two years later
defends the "historical borders" as having a firm international legal basis "stipulated
in treaties signed by the governments of the countries." 40 But this argument holds
little persuasion with the Chinese, who equate the Soviet Union's efforts to
emphasize formal sources of international law with those of bourgeois legal writers
who intentionally attempt to deceive people into believing that bourgeois
international law did not possess class character by citing flowery language of
equality in nineteenth century treaties between exploiting imperialist powers.4 '
In the aftermath of Cultural Revolution purges, writers on law in China have ceased
writing (after 1965) on topics of international law.42 However, an examination
of the polemics accompanying the 1969 clashes along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers
reveals no significant changes in the Chinese position on the illegality of the treaties
or on the perfidy of the Russian leaders in refusing to abrogate and renegotiate
them.43 The very concepts of socialist international law borrowed from the
Russians had little effect towards breaking the stalemate, a failure shared by general
international law in the Indian case.
Conclusions on Law and Policy
What conclusions are to be drawn from this examination of international legal
concepts employed by the Chinese in border disputes? First, although the tactical
variations pursued by Peking in these two disputes are expressed in terms drawn
from general international law (India), and on the other hand from socialist
international law (Russia), one cannot assume that this elasticity of printciple implies
a real duality in China's thinking in international relations. The obligations
postulated for all nations by Chinese legal scholars are strikingly similar, whether
arising from a general or a socialist construction of international law. The
conclusion that seems warranted is that law is viewed as an instrument to be used,
and varies with state policy.
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Our examination shows, however, that the PRC expects an entirely different
order of reciprocal views when dealing with a Communist government. Because
of the Soviet Union's traditional primacy among the so-called "bloc" nations, and the
historical contributions by Soviet writers and theoreticians to international law of
principles which are held to comprise the basis of state relations between fraternal
Communist countries, the Chinese government professes to be appalled at the
refusal of the Russian revolutionary pioneers' successors to submit on the border
question. The PRC's claims are grounded on the proposition that, as a matter
of dogma, principles of international law as developed by Communist states are to
lead the way to the construction of a higher order, an international system of
socialist international law. 44
Yet in this formulation of their border claims, the Chinese seem to forget, or
more accurately ignore, the impact a few decades of development have had upon the
views of the Soviets. The most incidental acquaintance with the history of
twentieth-century Sino-Russian relations reveals that the famous 1920 Declaration
of Lenin's Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leo Karakhan, which abrogated
the unequal treaties with China, has long been considered inoperative by the
Soviet Union. It appears almost as though the PRC is invoking outmoded Soviet
doctrines of socialist internationalism, doctrines developed in a bygone era of Russian
hegemony over the world Communist movement, to support China's claims to
reassert sovereignty over her "irredenta" territories. The very voicing of the claims
reflects the disintegration of the conditions which initially gave rise to the Soviet
doctrines. So we observe China characterizing the Soviet reluctance to restore
to China some 154,000 square miles of "historical" Manchuria, 169,000 square miles
in Central Asia, and the territory north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri
River (the Soviet Maritime Province) as a betrayal of proletarian internationalism."
The Chinese argue the proposition that from the principle of proletarian
internationalism flow concrete rights and obligations for Communist states, and
that as relations develop, these rights and obligations attain the status of international
law." If this is not persuasive to the Russians, then they are "social imperialists," 7
as much as Tito was a "revisionist heretic" in denying that proletarian
internationalism ruled out conflicts between Communist nations by definition."
For the future, barring a catastrophic war on the Asian mainland, the PRC
can be expected to continue to castigate the Soviet Union for its departure
from what the Chinese consider to be unassailable dogma, while the Soviet Union
will undoubtedly continue to be unmoved by China's arguments, basing its
uninterrupted possession of the disputed areas on historical justifications. It is
unlikely in this situation that the PRC will evolve a doctrine of international law,
socialist or otherwise, that the Soviets will find compelling.
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